The Tesar and Werner (1995) finding of very high turnover rates on foreign equity portfolios is based on an underestimation of cross-border equity positions. Foreign turnover rates calculated using information from comprehensive benchmark surveys on cross-border holdings are much lower than previously reported and comparable to domestic turnover rates. However, the basic intuition from the Tesar-Werner study, that transaction costs do not help explain the observed home bias, is confirmed using data on transaction costs in 41 markets.
Introduction
Foreign equities comprise only a small portion of investors' portfolios. For example, as shown in Figure 1 (a), foreign equities are now about 12 percent of U.S. investors' equity portfolios, a substantial increase from the one percent share two decades ago, but far smaller than the relative size of non-U.S. equities in world market capitalization. Figure 1 (b) condenses this information into a measure of equity home bias, defined as one minus the ratio of the share of non-U.S. equities in the U.S. and world portfolios. As the graph shows, the home bias in U.S. equity portfolios has decreased substantially over the past two decades, but remains quite high.
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This paper focuses on another stylized fact of international finance, high turnover rates on foreign equity portfolios, which is attributable to the evidence presented in Tesar and Werner (1995) .
In particular, Tesar and Werner showed that in 1989 Canadians turned over their foreign equity portfolio ten times faster than their domestic equity portfolio, and that U.S. residents turned over their foreign portfolio at twice the rate of their domestic portfolio. High foreign turnover presented a new puzzle for the theory of international portfolio choice. High turnover also ruled out high transaction costs associated with trading foreign securities as a plausible explanation of home bias.
The Tesar-Werner findings on foreign turnover rates have generated two new bodies of literature. First, models are now designed to produce high turnover on cross-border positions (Rowland (1999) , Coval (1999) , and Guidolin (2001) ). Second, the evidence against the plausibility of transaction costs as a factor in home bias is cited as reason to dismiss transaction costs as a source of barriers to international investment. This dismissal has led to models that rely on information asymmetries to explain portfolio flows (Kang and Stulz (1997) and Brennan and Cao (1997) ).
The Tesar-Werner findings were based on data published before reliable cross-border holdings data were available. Estimates of cross-border positions-the denominator in the turnover rate on foreign holdings-were constructed from cumulated capital flows and estimated valuation adjustments. Griever, Lee, and Warnock (2001) show that capital flows data are poorly designed for estimating positions in foreign securities. This deficiency stems from the following sources. A large component of the position is due to past valuation adjustments. Returns can vary substantially across markets, which means the geography of the flows is a vital component of holdings estimates.
But this is precisely the shortcoming of the capital flows data. Because capital flows data were designed according to the conventions of balance of payments accounting, they capture only the country the transaction goes through, not the country of the issuer. Section 4 asks the following question. Is home bias a consequence of high transaction costs? Data 2 Our foreign turnover rates are comparable to those on Korean equities that are implied by summary statistics presented in Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) . 3 on actual transactions data for 41 countries suggests that the answer is no: Transaction costs are not directly related to home bias. Section 5 concludes.
The Tesar-Werner Turnover Results Revisited
Tesar and Werner present three turnover measures. Domestic turnover is the ratio of annual transactions on a market to its capitalization. The turnover rate in foreign equity held by domestic residents is the ratio of annual transactions in foreign equities to the investment position in foreign equities. Similarly, the turnover rate in domestic equity held by foreigners is the ratio of foreigners' annual transactions in domestic equities to their holdings of domestic equities. This paper focuses on the first two measures. Table 1 shows turnover rates for 1989. Panels A and B give the original Tesar-Werner turnover rates. Panel C shows that the foreign turnover rate for U.S. investors falls in half to 1.18, and from 7.7 to 0.83 for Canadian investors, when more up-to-date estimates of cross-border holdings are employed.
2 In both cases, the sharp drop in the turnover rate was due to large upward revisions in estimates of foreign equity holdings. For the United States, these holdings estimates were more than doubled, from $92 billion, reported by Tesar and Werner, to $197 billion. For Canada, the revised estimates are approximately ten times that reported in Tesar and Werner.
The point of this paper is not to fault Tesar and Werner or the international investment position (IIP) data they used. The fact is, at least in the United States and likely elsewhere, capital flows data are ill-suited to estimate positions in foreign equities. The geography is confounded, with 6 Until 1997, Canadian IIP data for Canadian holdings of foreign stocks were reported only at book value. 7 See IMF (2000) for a discussion of the coordinated surveys. 5 the market value of Canadian holdings of U.S. equities (given by the U.S. benchmark survey and published by Statistics Canada) plus the market value of Canadian holdings of non-U.S. foreign equities (computed using the book value and price-to-book ratio).
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To restate, using information from two U.S. benchmark surveys of cross-border holdingsthe 1989 survey of foreign holdings of U.S. securities and the 1994 survey of U.S. holdings of foreign securities-the 1989 turnover rates on Canadian and U.S. investors' foreign equity portfolios fall sharply from 7.7 and 2.5 to 0.8 and 1.2, respectively. In the next section, turnover rates for 1997, when both the United States and Canada conducted benchmark surveys, are examined.
Turnover Rates Based on the 1997 CPIS
At the end of 1997, twenty-nine countries participated in the IMF-led Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), conducting simultaneous surveys to determine their residents' holdings of foreign securities. 7 The CPIS should provide accurate measures of foreign holdings of investors from twenty-nine countries and greatly enhance our knowledge of foreign turnover rates.
However, the data quality from the 1997 CPIS is not likely uniform. For many of these countries, the CPIS marked a first attempt: Only one-third had previously reported an IIP statement.
Data collection approaches varied by country. The main choices countries had to make were whether to (i) conduct the survey at the aggregate or security-by-security level, (ii) survey end-investors or custodians, and (iii) make participation in the survey compulsory or mandatory. Surveying custodians (if domestic custodians exist), rather than just large end-investors, provides greater coverage of households' holdings (and retail holdings, in general), while a security-by-security survey is likely to provide more reliable estimates than an aggregate survey. Countries that took the aggregate approach asked the respondents to write down holdings by country. In contrast, in the security-by-security approach, respondents provide security-by-security data on holdings. National authorities then could cross-check the data to determine the accuracy of the value and countryattribution of reported positions.
Most countries took an aggregate approach. Of those that conducted security-by-security surveys, very few included data from custodians and obtained commercial databases to aid in their cross-checks. Of those that did, to my knowledge only two, Canada and the United States, also report data on gross transactions (i.e., gross purchases and gross sales) in foreign equities, which are necessary to compute turnover rates. Restricting the analysis to those countries that followed best practices and report gross transactions data rules out all countries but Canada and the United States. 
But Do Transaction Costs Matter?
Turnover rates on foreign equity portfolios are much lower than previously reported, but the question remains: Can transaction costs explain the observed home bias in equity holdings?
Recently, researchers have investigated this question using a direct measure of transaction costs faced by institutional investors across many countries. The measure, compiled for markets in 42
countries by Elkins-McSherry Co. and analyzed in Domowitz, Glen, and Madhaven (2000) and Willoughby (1997) , is comprised of three components: commissions, fees, and market impact costs.
Market impact costs, or liquidity costs, are intended to measure the deviation of the transaction price from the price that would have prevailed had the trade not occurred. In practice, impact costs are measured as the deviation of the transaction price from the day's average price; see Willoughby (1998) for a discussion.
Results in Domowitz et al. (2000) suggest that transaction costs cannot explain the home bias in U.S. equity portfolios. Using cost-adjusted returns instead of unadjusted returns tilts the composition of a U.S. investor's global efficient portfolio from North America (which includes the relatively high cost Nasdaq) toward Europe and Latin America, indicating that incorporating costs makes the observed home bias even more of a puzzle.
Rather than working with cost-adjusted returns, Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2000) use data from the 1997 benchmark survey of U.S. holdings of foreign equities-the same data used in calculating the turnover estimates in Table 2 is defined relative to the foreign country's share of worldwide market capitalization. As the figure shows, it is difficult to discern a simple bilateral relationship between trading costs and the measure of bias; there is wide dispersion around a flat trendline.
While no direct evidence between transaction costs and home bias exists, there may well be an indirect relationship. Since the NYSE is one of the lower cost exchanges in the world, one way firms from high cost countries can alleviate trading costs in their stocks is by listing on the NYSE, as in the model of Martin and Rey (2000) . 9 The general result from Ahearne et al. (2000) is that countries whose firms tend to list on U.S. exchanges are less underweighted in U.S. portfolios. This listing effect is greater for high transaction cost countries, suggesting that transaction costs may well matter, albeit indirectly.
Conclusion
The Tesar-Werner home bias and high turnover puzzle is not evident when more up-to-date and higher quality estimates of cross-border holdings are used. Turnover rates on foreign equity portfolios are much lower than previously reported, and are roughly comparable to domestic turnover rates. New data on transaction costs confirm the main Tesar-Werner conclusion that transaction costs cannot explain the observed home bias.
Perhaps more important than the findings is the message that estimates of cross-border holdings can be inaccurate for the simple reason that capital flows data, designed based on the conventions of balance of payments accounting, identify the country through which the transaction was made. With inbound transactions data-that is, foreigners' net purchases of domestic securities-this is not a major obstacle for estimating aggregate positions. To estimate aggregate foreign holdings of U.S. equities, for example, knowledge of the country of the foreign investor is not necessary. We should be less confident, though, when estimating bilateral holdings, such as German holdings of U.S. stocks. With outbound transactions data-that is, domestic residents' net purchases of foreign securities-the country of the issuer of the security is a vital piece of information when estimating aggregate holdings of foreign securities. Since capital flows data do not identify the country of the issuer, a price index to revalue holdings cannot be chosen with confidence.
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Data quality should improve in the near future, because more countries are committing to relatively frequent benchmark surveys of cross-border holdings using harmonized definitions.
Twenty-nine countries conducted outbound surveys at the end of 1997. Over 75 countries are on board for an end-2001 survey. 11 Thereafter, it is quite possible that annual surveys will be conducted. Moreover, more countries will likely to be able to conduct a comprehensive, security-bysecurity survey, which, according to IMF (2000), should provide more accurate results. Notes and Sources: Panel A: Data are from the FIBV (www.fibv.com) and are not directly comparable because Nasdaq computes turnover rates differently from NYSE or TSE. The latter exchanges count as turnover only those transactions which pass through their trading systems or which take place on the exchange's trading floor. Nasdaq includes in its turnover figures all transactions subject to supervision by the market authority (transactions by member firms, and sometimes non-members, with no distinction between on-and off-market and transactions made into foreign markets reported on the national market). Transactions include trading in foreign firms listed on these exchanges and thus overstate the turnover rates on domestic equities. Data for 1999 suggest that the degree of overstatement is quite small. Note: Bias, or underweighting in the U.S. portfolio, is one minus the relative weight of a country's equities in the U.S. portfolio to its weight in world market capitalization, as computed in Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2000) . The trendline from a regression of bias on transaction costs is shown; the R 2 of the regression is 0.00.
